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Abstract 
Although the association between evangelical Protestant and Republican affiliations 
is now a fundamental aspect of American politics, this was not the case as recently 
as the early 1980s. Following work on secular political realignment and the issue 
evolution model of partisan change, I use four decades of repeated cross-sectional 
survey data to examine the dynamic correlates of evangelical Protestant and Repub-
lican affiliations, and how these factors promote changes in partisanship. Results 
show that evangelical Protestants have become relatively more likely to attend re-
ligious services and to oppose homosexuality, abortion, and welfare spending. Pe-
riod-specific mediation models show that opposition to abortion, homosexuality, 
and welfare spending have become more robust predictors of Republican affiliation. 
By the twenty-first century, differences in Republican affiliation between evangel-
ical Protestants and other religious affiliates are fully mediated by views of homo-
sexuality, abortion, and welfare spending; and differences in Republican affiliation 
between evangelicals and the religiously unaffiliated are substantially mediated by 
views of homosexuality, abortion, welfare spending, and military spending. These 
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results further understanding of rapid changes in politico-religious alignments and 
the increasing importance of moral and cultural issues in American politics, which 
supports a culture wars depiction of the contemporary political landscape. 
Keywords: Religion, Politics, Political party, Mediate, Homosexuality, Abortion, Wel-
fare, Military, Social change, Republicans
Although evangelical Protestants are now considerably more likely 
than other Americans to identify as Republican and to vote for Re-
publican candidates, this politico-religious alignment is comparatively 
new (Brooks and Manza, 2004; Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2007). 
Three trends contributed to the political realignment that produced 
the current politico-religious configurations. First, since the early 
1980s Americans who affiliate with evangelical Protestant denomi-
nations have become increasingly likely to also affiliate with the Re-
publican Party (Brooks and Manza, 2004; Fowler et al., 2014; Layman, 
2001). Second, there was a decline in Republican affiliation and vot-
ing for Republican candidates among non-evangelicals, and especially 
religiously unaffiliated Americans (Green, 2007; Pew Research Cen-
ter, 2015). Third, there was notable apostasy or religious disaffiliation 
among politically liberal Americans (Hout and Fischer, 2014; Putnam 
and Campbell, 2010). The result of these trends is that religious af-
filiation, particularly evangelical Protestant affiliation, is now more 
strongly associated with party choice than are education, income, age, 
gender, marital status, and union membership (Abramowitz and Saun-
ders, 2008). This article clarifies the mechanisms producing politico-
religious realignment and the issues that explain politicoreligious al-
liances by examining the temporally dynamic nature of factors that 
mediate the confluence between evangelical Protestantism and affil-
iation with the Republican Party. 
Divisive “takeoff issues” (Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007) re-
lated to sexuality and reproduction are now fundamental to party 
polarization. As DiMaggio et al. (1996:738) conclude, there has been 
a “striking divergence of attitudes between Democrats and Republi-
cans.” This party polarization, or party sorting (Fiorina and Abrams, 
2008), is most evident in increased differences between the parties 
in their views of abortion and sexuality (Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009; 
Ura and Ellis, 2012). These same issues are strongly influenced by re-
ligion (Bolzendahl and Brooks, 2005;Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 2007). 
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Americans have become more divided on what are often referred to 
as “moral” or “cultural” issues, and these divisions have been increas-
ingly reflected in party loyalties (Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998; 
Baldassarri and Gelman, 2008). Consequently, after decades of party 
dealignment, there has been an increase in party loyalty; but, unlike 
older forms of partisanship, this new partisanship is highly ideological 
(Abramowitz, 2010; Bafumi and Shapiro, 2009; Levendusky, 2009). As 
partisanship became more ideological in nature, it also became more 
closely associated with religion; and, as I demonstrate with the anal-
yses below, the issue composition of ideological partisanship largely 
explains the religious nature of contemporary American partisanship. 
This article expands on previous research by 1) simultaneously 
modeling the influence of multiple potential mediators on the asso-
ciation between evangelical Protestant and Republican affiliations, 
2) addressing temporal changes in this mediation, 3) quantifying in-
direct effects to evaluate relative mediating impact, and 4) distin-
guishing differences between evangelicals and other religious affili-
ates from differences between evangelicals and the disproportionately 
liberal and rapidly growing group of religiously unaffiliated Amer-
icans. Following the traditional approach to mediation (Baron and 
Kenny, 1986), I first examine temporal changes in the association be-
tween evangelical Protestantism and both Republican affiliation and 
the potential mediating factors. Following that, the focal analyses em-
ploy non-parametric bootstrapped standard errors to assess the sig-
nificance of standardized direct and indirect effects in the association 
between evangelical Protestant and Republican affiliations. With re-
peated cross-sectional survey data from 1973 through 2012, I conduct 
separate analyses for four roughly decade-long periods. Ancillary anal-
yses address alternative modes of social change, causality, and the po-
tential impact of omitted variables. 
The results show that differences in Republican affiliation be-
tween evangelical Protestants and other religious affiliates are pre-
dominantly due to differences in views of homosexuality and abor-
tion. While differences in Republican affiliation between evangelicals 
and the religiously unaffiliated are similarly motived by views of re-
production and sexuality, views of government spending on the mil-
itary and welfare also mediate much of the difference between evan-
gelicals and the unaffiliated, particularly in the twenty-first century. 
Phil ip  S chwadel  in  So cial  Sc ience  Research 62  (2017)        4
I conclude by discussing how these trends run counter to the assump-
tion of crosscutting interests in American politics (Baldassarri and 
Gelman, 2008), are antithetical to the liberal viewpoint (Rawls, 1993) 
and secularization theories (Gorski, 2000) that emphasize a clear sep-
aration between religion and the state, and support the culture wars 
perspective (Hunter, 1991) by demonstrating how contemporary po-
litical mobilization relies on divisive cultural issues. 
1. Potential causes of evangelical-Republican confluence 
The increased confluence between evangelical Protestant and Re-
publican affiliations since the 1980s is characteristic of what Key 
(1959:199) termed secular political realignment: “a movement of the 
members of a population category from party to party that extends 
over several presidential elections and appears to be independent of 
the peculiar factors influencing the vote at individual elections.” The 
sources of secular political realignment manifest in both direct and 
indirect effects. The distinction here is between changes in the effect 
of being evangelical Protestant itself and changes in mediating fac-
tors associated with both evangelical Protestant and Republican affil-
iations. In regards to direct effects, the evangelical community may 
have become more Republican—and the non-evangelical community 
less Republican—due to qualities intrinsic to affiliating with specific 
religious organizations. For instance, political cues from the pulpit 
and from face-to-face interactions with other churchgoers can influ-
ence political perspectives and loyalties (Wald et al., 1988; Welch et 
al., 1993). In particular, the growth of the Christian Right in the 1980s 
could have promoted political realignment by drawing evangelicals to 
the Republican Party, by pushing non-evangelicals away, and by en-
couraging liberals to change religious affiliations or disaffiliate from 
organized religion (Putnam and Campbell, 2010). 
As Wald and Calhoun-Brown (2007:229) note, however, “At best, 
the Christian Right intensified changes that were already underway.” 
It did so, they argue, by emphasizing moral and social issues, and dif-
ferences between candidates on these issues. Thus, rather than re-
ligious affiliation itself, it may be views on specific issues that lead 
evangelical Protestants to affiliate with the Republican Party, lead 
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non-evangelicals to not to affiliate with the Republican Party, and po-
tentially lead some liberal evangelicals to change affiliations or dis-
affiliate altogether. In other words, there may have been changes in 
the indirect effects of religious affiliation on Republican identifica-
tion. This comports with the depiction of political realignment as a re-
sponse to issue evolution (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). In this case, 
the evolution of issues that resonate with the evangelical Protestant 
constituency and that are central to the Republican Party Platform. 
The question remains, what are the key factors mediating differences 
in Republican affiliation between evangelicals and other Americans? 
And how have these mediating factors changed over time? 
1.1. Abortion and homosexuality 
Although other issue domains may be relevant to the confluence be-
tween evangelical and Republican affiliations, abortion and sexuality 
should be the most prominent. Several researchers suggest that the 
mutual emphasis on “traditional values,” “family values,” or “moral 
values” is a key component in the connection between evangelical 
Protestantism and the Republican Party (e.g. Baldassarri and Gelman, 
2008; Layman and Carsey, 2002); and, as Greeley and Hout (2006: 
134) note, in the evangelical community “‘Family values’ and ‘moral 
values’ apparently means abortion and homosexuality.” Not only are 
evangelicals relatively opposed to legalized abortion, but their oppo-
sition to abortion has increased (Bolzendahl and Brooks, 2005). Evan-
gelical Protestants are also disproportionately likely to oppose homo-
sexuality (Bolzendahl andBrooks,2005), to such an extent that there 
is a “subcultural orientation” on the issue (Gay et al., 1996). This gap 
in views of homosexuality increased as other Americans rapidly ad-
opted more liberal views on the issue (Sherkat et al., 2011). Evangel-
icals are particularly likely to perceive political cues related to both 
sexual behaviors and abortion from their pastors (Welch et al.,1993), 
and such religious origins give political cues greater weight (Djupe 
and Gwiasda, 2010). Thus, not surprisingly, Americans who oppose 
abortion and homosexuality view those issues as highly politically sa-
lient (Putnam and Campbell, 2010). 
These same “moral” issues have become central to the Republican 
Platform and to members of the Republican Party. The Republican 
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Platform has increasingly denounced abortion, and Republicans are 
now relatively likely to oppose legal abortion (Layman, 2001; Putnam 
and Campbell, 2010). Opposition to homosexuality, particularly same-
sex marriage, has also become central to the Republican Platform and 
ubiquitous among members of the Republican Party (Layman, 2001; 
Ura and Ellis, 2012). Among white Americans, for example, the cor-
relation between opposition to homosexuality and Republican affili-
ation tripled between 1985 and 1995 (Putnam and Campbell, 2010). 
The increased emphasis on issues such as abortion and homosexuality 
by Republican politicians (Glaeser and Ward, 2005) has led to greater 
political participation among evangelical Protestants (Camp, 2008). 
In other words, it may be views on abortion and homosexuality rather 
than religious affiliation itself that leads many evangelicals to affili-
ate with the Republican Party. Not inconsequentially, these same is-
sues may lead some non-evangelicals to choose not to affiliate with 
the Republican Party, and the politicization of these issues can poten-
tially promote apostasy among more liberal religious affiliates (Hout 
and Fischer, 2014). The mutual and intensified weight given to these 
issues among evangelicals and Republicans combined with opposition 
to the politicization of these issues among liberals and non-evangel-
icals suggests that views of abortion (Hypothesis 1) and views of ho-
mosexuality (Hypothesis 2) increasingly mediate the association be-
tween evangelical and Republican affiliations. 
1.2. Government spending 
The confluence between evangelical Protestant and Republican affil-
iations may also be influenced by shared views of the proper role of 
government. In particular, the Republican Party has repeatedly op-
posed the expansion of welfare and championed limiting government’s 
role in the redistribution of wealth (Layman and Carsey, 2002;Mc-
Carty et al., 2006), and Americans who affiliate with the Republican 
Party are relatively likely to oppose increased spending on welfare 
(Schneider and Jacoby, 2005). While evangelical organizations histori-
cally supported economic reforms (Wilson, 2009), and continue to ex-
press “concern and compassion for the poor” (Hackworth, 2010:92), 
“almost every reference to welfare [now] includes an implied or di-
rect critique of government-based efforts to solve it.” Consequently, 
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evangelical Protestants are now relatively likely to oppose the govern-
ment’s role in the redistribution of wealth (Wald and Calhoun-Brown, 
2007). Views of welfare spending should therefore increasingly me-
diate the association between evangelical and Republican affiliations 
(Hypothesis 3). 
In contrast to its view of welfare spending, the Republican Party 
often supports spending on the military. Since the 1960s, Republican 
politicians have generally favored military growth more than Dem-
ocrats (Fordham, 2007), and Republican voters disproportionately 
support increased military spending (Goertzel, 1987). Contemporary 
evangelical Protestants express similar views on the military (Lay-
man and Hussey, 2007). Evangelical Protestant support for military 
and defense spending was spurred on by Christian Right organiza-
tions that gained prominence beginning in the 1980s (Himmelstein, 
1983), and the increasing emphasis those organizations placed on the 
importance of protecting Israel (Guth, 2009). Evangelical Protestants 
are now relatively likely to support increased military spending (Ko-
hut et al., 2000). Consequently, views of military spending should in-
creasingly mediate the association between evangelical and Republi-
can affiliations (Hypothesis 4). 
Evangelical Protestants and other religious affiliates often differ 
in their “social traditionalism,” but less so in their economic conser-
vatism (Johnson and Tamney, 2001). Thus, while abortion and homo-
sexuality may be key factors mediating differences in party choice be-
tween evangelicals and other religious affiliates, views of spending on 
the military and welfare may not be as relevant. Secular or non-reli-
gious Americans, however, have a long history of emphasizing social 
justice (LeDrew, 2015). Although denominational differences in sup-
port for the redistribution of wealth appear to have declined, religion 
itself remains relevant (Davis and Robinson, 1996; Wuthnow, 1988). 
Opposition to war is also a hallmark of the secular community. Lead-
ers of the contemporary atheist movement, for example, often depict 
religion as the primary motivation for war (Atran and Ginges, 2012); 
though only about a third of religiously unaffiliated Americans are 
atheist or agnostic (Sherkat, 2008). Religiously unaffiliated Ameri-
cans more broadly are relatively likely to emphasize international co-
operation (Greeley and Hout, 2006) and oppose doctrines such as pre-
emptive and unilateral military action (Guth, 2009). Consequently, 
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evangelicals and non-religious Americans are especially likely to di-
verge in their views of the military and the redistribution of wealth 
(Kohut et al., 2000; Putnam and Campbell, 2010;Wald and Calhoun-
Brown, 2007). Therefore, views of welfare (Hypothesis 5) and mili-
tary (Hypothesis 6) spending should play a particularly large role in 
mediating differences in Republican affiliation between evangelicals 
and the religiously unaffiliated.  
1.3. Other factors: religious participation and region 
Moving beyond political perspectives, the confluence between evan-
gelical Protestant and Republican affiliations may be influenced by 
a shared propensity for religious participation (Fowler et al., 2014). 
Evangelical Protestants attend religious services more frequently than 
affiliates of other major religious traditions and, of course, more so 
than the religiously unaffiliated (Schwadel, 2010). Religious service 
attendance has similarly become a key component of Republican affil-
iation (Manza and Brooks, 1999). Americans who regularly attend re-
ligious services (Kellstedt et al., 2007), particularly those who attend 
evangelical churches (Patrikios, 2008), are relatively likely to be Re-
publican. Moreover, evangelicals’ views on issues such as homosexu-
ality and abortion are reinforced by their frequent service attendance 
(Sherkat et al., 2011), which further suggests that evangelicals’ reli-
gious participation may promote Republican affiliation. Conversely, 
non-evangelicals’ relatively infrequent religious participation may lead 
to less support for the Republican Party and its stances on issues such 
as abortion and homosexuality. High levels of religious participation 
in the evangelical Protestant community combined with growth in the 
importance of religious participation among Republicans suggests that 
religious service attendance increasingly mediates the association be-
tween evangelical and Republican affiliations (Hypothesis 7). 
Finally, location may play a role in politico-religious realignment. 
The South has long been disproportionately evangelical Protestant 
(Shibley, 1996). While the South was once a bastion of the Demo-
cratic Party, it has become more Republican (Black and Black, 2003). 
This change in southern political culture may influence evangelical 
Protestants’ political preferences (Bass and Rozell, 2009), particularly 
since growth in Republican affiliation in the South began more than 
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a decade before growth in Republican affiliation among evangelicals 
(Layman, 2001). Conversely, secular Americans are particularly un-
likely to live in the South (Baker and Smith, 2009). The regional con-
centration of religious affiliations combined with political changes in 
the South suggest that southern residence increasingly mediates the 
association between evangelical and Republican affiliations, particu-
larly differences between evangelicals and the unaffiliated (Hypoth-
esis 8). 
2. Data 
I use data from the 1973 to 2012 General Social Survey (GSS) to exam-
ine changes in the factors that mediate the confluence between evan-
gelical Protestant and Republican affiliations. The GSS is a nation-
ally-representative survey of noninstitutionalized adults living in the 
United States. The survey has been administered annually or bienni-
ally since 1972. The response rate ranges between 70 and 82 percent 
across years of the survey, according to Response Rate 5 as defined 
by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (2008). Sev-
eral key questions were not included in the 1972,1975,1978, 1983, and 
1986 surveys, and were only asked of subsamples of respondents be-
ginning in 1988. Although 15,760 cases include data on the focal vari-
ables, 1,280 of those are missing data on control variables, resulting in 
14,480 cases.1 See Smith et al. (2013) for more information on the GSS. 
The primary dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of affili-
ation with the Republican Party. The GSS asks respondents “Generally 
speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, 
Independent, or what?” The dependent variable contrasts respondents 
who answer strong Republican or not very strong Republican ( = 1) 
with strong and not very strong Democrats, Independents, and affili-
ates of other parties ( = 0). The mean of Republican affiliation is 0.252 
(see Table 1 for descriptive statistics). 
1 While 1,143 cases are missing income data, fewer than 45 cases are missing data 
on each of the other control variables. Religious affiliation is unrelated to miss-
ing income data (7.2% of evangelicals, other affiliates, and the unaffiliated are 
missing income data). Eight percent of Republican and 6.9% of non-Republican 
respondents are missing income data. 
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The focal independent variables assess religious affiliation using the 
denomination classification developed by Steensland et al. (2000). The 
models include dummy variables for non-evangelical affiliates (NEAs) 
and the religiously unaffiliated (i.e. no religious preference). The NEA 
category is composed of all religious affiliates other than evangelical 
Protestants, including Protestants affiliated with non-evangelical de-
nominations, other Christians, and affiliates of non- Christian reli-
gions. Evangelical Protestant is the omitted reference category. This 
approach allows mediating variables to have disparate effects on dif-
ferences between evangelicals other religious affiliates and differences 
between evangelicals the religiously unaffiliated. 
Table 1. Variable means and standard deviations.
 Mean  Std. Dev.
Dependent variable
Republican affiliation  0.252
Mediating/dependent variables
Religious service attendance  3.835  2.664
Anti-abortion scale  0.333  0.330
Anti-homosexual  0.701
Too much on welfare  0.498
Too little on military  0.233
South  0.343
Independent variables
Evangelical protestant  0.246
Non-evangelical protestant religious affiliate  0.651
No religious affiliation  0.103
Time  1.170 1.084
Age  43.973  16.708
Female  0.522
African American  0.134
Other race  0.036
White  0.831
Bachelor’s degree  0.208
Family income (log)  10.357  0.955
Married  0.570
Children in home  0.412
Urban 0.229
Suburban  0.243
Other Urban  0.387
Rural  0.141
N = 14,480
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Six mediating variables are used test the hypotheses. All mediating 
variables are coded so they should be positively associated with evan-
gelical Protestant and Republican affiliations. Religious service atten-
dance ranges from never ( = 0) to several times a week ( = 8). The 
views of homosexuality variable compares those who say “sexual rela-
tions between two adults of the same sex” is always wrong or almost 
always wrong ( = 1) with those who say it is wrong sometimes or not 
wrong at all ( = 0). Views of abortion are measured with a scale cre-
ated from six survey items that ask respondents if they believe abor-
tion should be legal in various circumstances (0  =  yes, 1  =  no).2 Re-
sponses are summed and divided by six (Cronbach’s α  =  0.854). A 
dichotomous variable compares those who believe we spend too much 
( = 1) on welfare with  those who say welfare spending is too little 
or about right ( = 0). Another dichotomous variables compares those 
who think we spend too little ( = 1) on “military, armaments, and de-
fense” (henceforth referred to as military) with those who say we 
spend too much or about the right amount ( = 0). Region is assessed 
with a dummy variable indicating the South Census Region. All mod-
els include controls for age, sex, race, education, family income, mar-
ital status, the presence of children in the home, and urbanity.3 
The coding of time balances the focus on temporal change with re-
taining enough respondents in each period for period-specific mod-
els. Consequently, I compare respondents across four roughly decade-
long periods: 1973–1980, 1982–1991, 1993–2002, and 2004–2012. This 
coding scheme is manifested in both an ordinal time variable (coded 
0 for 1973–1980,1 for 1982–1991, 2 for 1993–2002, and 3 for 2004–
2012) and in separate models for each period. 
2 The circumstances are “if there is a strong chance of serious defect in the baby,” 
“if she is married and does not want any more children,” “if the woman’s own 
health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy,” “if the family has a very low 
income and cannot afford any more children,” “if she became pregnant as a re-
sult of a rape,” and “if she is not married and does not want to marry the man.” 
3 Age is coded in years of age. Age is centered on its mean and age-squared is in-
cluded in the models when statistically significant (p < 0.05). Dummy variables 
for female, African-American, and “other” race respondents control for sex and 
race. Social class is measured with a dummy variable for college graduates and 
the log of family income in constant (2000) dollars. Household composition is 
based on dummy variables for married respondents and those with children un-
der the age of 18 currently living in their homes. Dummy variables for the 100 
largest SMSAs (“urban”), suburbs of the 100 largest SMSAs (“suburban”), and ru-
ral areas, with “other urban” as the reference, control for city size. 
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3. Analysis techniques 
The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, I present results from OLS 
and binary logistic regression models of Republican affiliation and the 
proposed mediating variables using aggregate GSS data. The models 
include interactions between religious affiliations and time, thus es-
tablishing temporal changes in the association between 1) religious 
affiliation and Republican affiliation and 2) religious affiliation and 
the proposed mediating variables. These models address key require-
ments for mediation according to Baron and Kenny (1986): the inde-
pendent variable must be associated with both the mediating variables 
and the dependent variable. While Baron and Kenny’s (1986) influen-
tial “causal steps” approach informs the general modeling strategy, it 
cannot quantify multiple indirect effects or indicate if some pathways 
are irrelevant (Hayes, 2009; MacKinnon et al., 2007). 
The product of coefficients approach to mediation (Alwin and 
Hauser, 1975; see review by MacKinnon et al., 2007) addresses this 
problem. Consequently, the second step is to estimate direct and indi-
rect effects of religious affiliation on Republican affiliation in each of 
the four time periods using the product of coefficients approach. This 
method of quantifying indirect effects requires a series of models of 
the mediating variables as well as both reduced-form and full mod-
els of the dependent variable, which are used to estimate the relevant 
coefficients (see Hayes and Preacher, 2010). The direct and indirect 
effects below are derived from standardized coefficients to compen-
sate for the mix of dichotomous and continuous mediating variables 
(MacKinnon and Dwyer, 1993). Focal odds ratios from full (i.e. includ-
ing mediating and control variables) binary logistic regression mod-
els of Republican affiliation are also reported. 
The standardized direct and indirect effects reported below employ 
non-parametric bootstrapped standard errors based on resampling 
the data 5000 times with replacement, which should provide reliable 
estimates of the standard errors (Guan, 2003). This is the preferred 
method for estimating indirect effects when there are multiple, mixed-
form mediators (Preacher and Hayes, 2008). This approach provides 
greater statistical power and less rigid assumptions about the distri-
bution of standard errors than other methods (Bollen and Stine, 1990; 
Preacher and Hayes, 2004). Percentile bootstrapped standard errors 
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are used to limit the potential for type I error (Hayes and Scharkow, 
2013). Given the method of estimating standard errors, it is important 
to note that none of the effects that are flagged as statistically signif-
icant contain zero in the 95% confidence interval (confidence inter-
vals not shown). 
Third, I discuss results from analyses that address alternative 
modes of social change, causal direction, and other potentially salient 
social and political perspectives. Specifically, I report results from age-
period-cohort models to assess the potential for generational change, 
models that separate religious switchers from those who were raised 
and remain evangelical to account for the possibility that political 
party influences religious affiliation, and models with views of race 
and sex roles to gauge other potential mediating factors. Relevant op-
erationalizations and methodologies are discussed as those models 
are introduced. 
4. Results 
4.1. Effects of religious tradition on mediating variables and Re-
publican affiliation 
Table 2 reports focal results from OLS and binary logistic regression 
models of Republican affiliation and the mediating variables, with in-
teractions between time and religious affiliations (see Appendix A for 
control variable results). Figs.1 and 2 depict changes in the effects of 
religious affiliations from the statistically significant interactions. The 
results from logistic regressions shown in Fig.1 are reported in odds 
ratios. Odds ratios above one indicate positive effects and those be-
low one indicate negative effects. 
The interactions in the model of Republican affiliation indicate that 
differences between evangelicals and both nonevangelical affiliates 
(b  =  –0.230) and the unaffiliated (b  =  –0.309) increased over time. 
Non-evangelical affiliates (NEAs) were no less likely than evangeli-
cals to affiliate with the Republican Party in 1973–80 (NEA main effect 
=  0.000, n.s.). As Fig. 1a shows, by 2004–12, NEAs’ odds of Repub-
lican affiliation were 50% less than the odds for evangelical Protes-
tants. The odds of Republican identification for the unaffiliated were 
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Fig. 1. Changes in effect of non-evangelical affiliate and unaffiliated (relative to 
evangelical protestant) on dichotomous outcomes. Figure depicts results from 
models in Table 2.
Table 2. Focal results from OLS and binary logistic regression models of Republican affiliation, living in the south, re-
ligious service Attendance, and views of homosexuality, abortion, welfare spending, and military spending.
                                           Binary logistic regression                                                                                 OLS regression
    Anti- Too much  Too little on   Anti- Attendance 
 Republican homosexual on welfare military South abortion Service  
Non-evangelical affiliatea 0.000  −0.798***  −0.026  −0.323*** −1.331***  −0.040*** −0.417*** 
 (0.069) (0.089) (0.061) (0.067) (0.063) (0.009) (0.071)
*Time −0.230***  −0.136**  −0.083*  0.023 0.208***  −0.044***  −0.167***  
 (0.042) (0.051) (0.038) (0.043) (0.039) (0.006) (0.044)
Unaffiliateda −0.677***  −1.865***  −0.186 −0.498*** −1.587***  −0.196*** −3.375*** 
 (0.145) (0.127)  (0.108)  (0.132) (0.127)  (0.016)  (0.124)
*Time −0.309***  −0.112  −0.086  −0.052 0.173**  −0.042*** −0.087 
 (0.075) (0.068) (0.057)  (0.071) (0.064)  (0.009)  (0.066)
Time 0.290***  −0.274***  −0.090** −0.074*  −0.028  0.062***  0.032 
 (0.035) (0.046)  (0.033) (0.036) (0.032) (0.005)  (0.038)
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approximately 50% less than evangelicals’ odds in 1973–80, and by 
2004–12 this difference in odds increased to 80% (Fig. 1b). These 
results demonstrate that evangelicals became increasingly likely to 
affiliate with the Republican Party (time main effect b  =  0.290), 
and differences between evangelicals and other Americans increased 
considerably. 
Polarization between evangelicals and other Americans is evident 
in the remaining models in Table 2. For instance, there was growth 
in the difference between NEAs and evangelical Protestants in their 
likelihood of both opposing homosexuality (b  =  –0.136) and agreeing 
that we spend too much on welfare (b  =  –0.083). As Fig. 1a shows, 
NEAs’ odds of opposing homosexuality were 55% less than the odds 
for evangelicals in 1973–80 and 70% less in 2004–12.While NEAs’ 
odds of saying we spend too much on welfare were basically equiva-
lent to evangelicals’ odds in 1973–80, in 2004–12 their odds were 24% 
less than the odds for evangelicals. The unaffiliated were considerably 
less likely than evangelicals to oppose homosexuality in 1973–80 (un-
affiliated main effect b = –1.865), and this did not change significantly. 
Similarly, while both the unaffiliated and NEAs were less likely than 
evangelicals to say we spend too little on the military in 1973–80 (see 
main effects), this did not change over time. Unlike the other poten-
tial mediators, differences in the likelihood of living in the South be-
tween evangelicals and both NEAs and the unaffiliated declined over 
Fig. 2. Changes in effect of non-evangelical affiliate and unaffiliated (relative to 
evangelical protestant) on anti-abortion scale and religious service Attendance. 
Figure depicts results from models in Table 2.
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time. For instance, NEAs’ odd of living in the South were 74% less 
than the odds for evangelicals in 1973–80 and 51% less in 2004–12. 
The statistically significant interactions from the models of ser-
vice attendance and opposition to abortion are depicted in Fig. 2. Both 
NEAs (main effect b  =  –0.040) and the unaffiliated (main effect b 
=  –0.196) were less likely than evangelicals to oppose abortion in 
1973–80, and these differences increased over time (b = –0.044 and 
–0.042, respectively). This equates to an estimated 0.98 standard de-
viation difference in the anti-abortion scale between evangelicals and 
the unaffiliated in 2004–12, and a 0.52 standard deviation difference 
between evangelicals and NEAs. Similarly, the already notable differ-
ence in religious service attendance between NEAs and evangelicals 
in 1973–80 more than doubled by 2004–12 (Fig. 2), resulting in an es-
timated 0.35 standard deviation difference in service attendance be-
tween evangelicals and NEAs in 2004–12. The gap in service atten-
dance between evangelicals and the unaffiliated was substantial in 
1973–80 (main effect b  =  –3.375, which equates to a 1.23 standard 
deviation difference in attendance), and did not change meaningfully 
over time. In sum, evangelicals remained relatively likely to attend 
religious services, support military spending, live in the South, and 
oppose abortion, homosexuality, and welfare spending, which means 
any of these factors may mediate the association between evangeli-
cal Protestant and Republican affiliations. Nonetheless, the decline in 
evangelicals’ relative likelihood of living in the South suggests that re-
gion does not explain the increasing confluence between religion and 
politics. Conversely, growth in evangelicals’ relative likelihood of fre-
quent service attendance and opposing homosexuality, welfare, and 
abortion suggest that these factors may play key roles. 
4.2. Direct and indirect effects of religious tradition on Republican 
affiliation 
The top portion of Table 3 reports focal results (odds ratios) from full 
(i.e. including both control and mediating variables) binary logistic 
regression models of Republican affiliation. The bottom portion of 
Table 3 reports standardized total, direct, and indirect effects of NEA 
and unaffiliated on Republican affiliation. Total effects are derived 
from models without the mediating variables and direct effects are 
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Table 3. Focal odds ratios from binary logistic regression models of Republican affiliation, and standardized direct and 
indirect effects of non-evangelical affiliate and unaffiliated on Republican affiliation.a
Odds ratios (full model)                         1973–1980                    1982–1991                      1993–2002                     2004–2012
Non-evangelical affiliatea   1.083  0.756**  0.733**  0.821
Unaffiliateda  0.590**  0.504***  0.509***  0.369***
South  0.828*  0.912  1.026  1.020
Religious service attendance  1.060***  1.030  1.025  1.044
Anti-abortion scale  0.574***  0.900  1.896***  1.545*
Anti-homosexual 1.305**  1.704***  1.709***  1.715***
Too much on welfare  1.486***  1.430***  1.759***  2.083***
Too little on military  1.305***  1.244*  1.955***  2.321***
                                                                      1973–1980                    1982–1991                      1993–2002                     2004–2012
Direct & indirect effects  Beta  se  Beta  se  Beta  se  Beta  se
Non-Evangelical Affiliatea
Total effect  0.015  0.021  –0.103  0.023***  –0.162  0.026***  –0.145  0.033***
Direct effect    –0.071  0.024**  –0.079  0.026***  –0.050  0.034
Total indirect effect    –0.033  0.010**  –0.083  0.012***  –0.096  0.015***
Indirect effects:
Religious service attendance    –0.005  0.003  –0.004  0.003  –0.011  0.007
Anti-abortion scale    0.003  0.003  –0.020  0.005*** – 0.018  0.008*
Anti-homosexual    –0.031  0.007***  –0.038  0.009***  –0.045  0.012***
Too much on welfare    –0.004  0.002  –0.005  0.004 – 0.013  0.006*
Too little on military    –0.002  0.002  –0.014  0.005**  –0.008  0.006
South    0.007  0.007  –0.002  0.006 – 0.001  0.006
Unaffiliateda
Total effect  –0.100  0.026***  –0.142  0.027*** –0.227 0.029*** –0.362 0.035***
Direct effect  –0.072  0.027**  –0.097  0.028*** –0.116 0.031*** –0.192 0.041***
Total indirect effect  –0.028  0.009**  –0.044  0.011*** –0.111 0.016*** –0.169 0.022***
Indirect effects:
Religious service attendance  –0.028  0.007***  –0.014  0.008  –0.014  0.011  –0.032  0.019
Anti-abortion scale  0.015  0.004***  0.004  0.005  –0.029  0.007***  –0.028  0.012*
Anti-homosexual  –0.015  0.005**  –0.034  0.008***  –0.047  0.010***  –0.059  0.016***
Too much on welfare  –0.004  0.002  –0.001  0.002  –0.011  0.004**  –0.019  0.006**
Too little on military  –0.006  0.002**  –0.004  0.002  –0.009  0.004*  –0.030  0.007***
South  0.010  0.005*  0.005  0.005  –0.001  0.0005  –0.001 0.007
N   5191   3924   3073   2292
All models control for age, sex, race, marital status, children in the home, education, family income, and urbanity.
* p ≤ 0.05 ; ** p ≤ 0.01 ; *** p ≤ 0.001 (two-tailed test).
a. Evangelical Protestant omitted reference category.
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derived from models that control for mediating variables. Interpret-
ing the substantive impact of the standardized direct and indirect ef-
fects is complicated by the lack of observed variance for the dichoto-
mous mediators (see MacKinnon and Dwyer, 1993). Consequently, I 
focus on comparing the relative size of the standardized effects. The 
odds ratios indicate magnitude of the direct effects. 
In accord with the earlier results, the 1973–80 results in Table 3 show 
that NEA was not associated with Republican affiliation in the first 
time period (total effect  =  0.015, n.s.) while unaffiliated had a strong, 
negative effect on Republican affiliation (total effect = –0.100). Unaf-
filiated also had a robust, negative direct effect (–0.072) in this first 
time period. In other words, large differences in party affiliation be-
tween evangelicals and the unaffiliated persist after controlling for 
the mediating variables. The magnitude of the direct effect is evident 
from the odds ratio (0.590), which indicates that the odds of Repub-
lican affiliation were 41% less for the unaffiliated that for evangeli-
cal Protestants. The standardized effects show that almost one-half of 
the effect of unaffiliated (total effect = –0.100)was mediated by reli-
gious service attendance, opposition to homosexuality, and support 
for military spending (–0.028 þ –0.015 þ –0.006  =  –0.049) in 1973–
80. Conversely, views of abortion exacerbated differences between 
evangelicals and the unaffiliated (Beta  =  0.015). This is due to the 
strong, negative effect of the anti-abortion scale on Republican affil-
iation in 1973–80 (odds ratio  =  0.574). 
The total effects indicate that both NEA (–0.103) and unaffiliated 
(–0.142) were strongly and negatively associated with Republican 
identification in 1982–91. Just under a third of these effects were me-
diated (total indirect effects  =  –0.033 and –0.044, respectively), pri-
marily by opposition to homosexuality (Beta  =  –0.031 for NEA and 
–0.034 for unaffiliated). Unlike the first time period, religious service 
attendance, views of abortion, and living in the South were not sig-
nificantly associated with Republican affiliation in 1982–91 (see odds 
ratios at top of Table 3). Despite the strong mediating role of views of 
homosexuality, unaffiliated and NEA had robust, direct effects on Re-
publican identification in 1982–91—the odds of Republican affiliation 
were 24% less for NEAs than for evangelicals (odds ratio  =  0.756) 
and 50% less for the unaffiliated than for evangelicals (odds ratio  = 
0.504). 
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The total effects of NEA (–0.162) and unaffiliated (–0.227) were 
large in 1993–2002. Just over half of the NEA effect was mediated by 
views of homosexuality, abortion, and military spending (total indi-
rect effect  =  –0.083). Just under half of the unaffiliated effect was 
mediated by views of homosexuality, abortion, welfare spending, and 
military spending (total indirect effect = –0.111). Similar to the previ-
ous time period, in addition to these robust indirect effects, NEA and 
unaffiliated also had large direct effects on Republican identification 
in 1993–2002: the odds of Republican affiliation were 27% less for 
NEAs than for evangelicals (odds ratio  =  0.733) and 49% less for the 
unaffiliated than for evangelicals (odds ratio  =  0.509). 
The total effects of unaffiliated (–0.362) and NEA (–0.145) on Re-
publican identification remained robust in 2004–12. In contrast to the 
previous two time periods, however, the effect of NEA was fully me-
diated (direct effect = –0.050, n.s.). This is primarily due to differ-
ences in views of homosexuality (Beta  =  –0.045), though opposition 
to abortion (Beta  =  –0.018) and welfare spending (Beta  =  –0.013) 
were also relevant. Unaffiliated continued to have a strong, direct ef-
fect on Republican affiliation in 2004–12—the odds of Republican af-
filiation were 63% less for the unaffiliated than for evangelicals (odds 
ratio  =  0.369). Nonetheless, just under half of the total effect of un-
affiliated was mediated. Similar to NEA, the effect of unaffiliated was 
primarily mediated by views of homosexuality (Beta = –0.059) and to 
a lesser extent opposition to abortion (Beta  =  –0.028) and welfare 
spending (Beta  =  –0.019). Unlike NEA, views of military spending 
also mediated a notable proportion of the difference in Republican af-
filiation between evangelicals and the unaffiliated (Beta  =  –0.030). 
Comparing across time periods, the effects of opposition to homo-
sexuality, opposition to welfare spending, and support for military 
spending on Republican affiliation increased considerably, and the ef-
fect of opposition to abortion reversed direction (see odds ratios at top 
of Table 3). These findings are indicative of party polarization. Early 
growth in differences in Republican affiliation between evangelicals 
and other religious affiliates was primarily due to the direct effects 
of religious affiliation. While less than one-third of the effect of NEA 
was mediated in 1982–91, by 2004–12 differences in Republican iden-
tification between NEAs and evangelicals were fully mediated by op-
position to homosexuality, abortion, and welfare spending. There was 
Phil ip  S chwadel  in  So cial  Sc ience  Research 62  (2017)        20
also considerable growth in the proportion of the total effect of unaf-
filiated that was mediated: 28% in 1973–80, 31% in 1982–91, 49% in 
1993–2002, and 47% in 2004–12. Still, evangelicals and the unaffil-
iated appear to differ in their political party preferences for reasons 
not captured by either the mediating or control variables included in 
the models in Table 3 since unaffiliated continued to have a signifi-
cant, direct effect in all four time periods.4  
4.3. Additional considerations: cohorts, causality, and omitted 
variables 
There are several noteworthy limitations to the above analysis that 
can be at least partially addressed using alternative analysis tech-
niques and additional GSS data. For instance, while I focus on changes 
over time, contemporary political theory contends that party identi-
fication is resistant to change over the life course (Patrikios, 2008). 
This suggests that political realignment (Alwin and Krosnick, 1991), 
particularly growth in the association between evangelical Protes-
tant and Republican affiliations (Putnam and Campbell, 2010), occurs 
predominantly across birth cohorts. I examined this possibility using 
hierarchical age-period-cohort (HAPC) models of Republican affilia-
tion. These models treat time periods (i.e. survey year) and birth co-
horts (i.e. year of birth)5 as cross-classified level-2 units of analysis 
in a multilevel model (see Yang and Land, 2013). A logit link function 
compensates for the dichotomous outcome.  
Random effects from HAPC models of Republican affiliation, with 
and without mediating variables, are reported in Appendix B. The 
4 An alternative approach to mediation is to employ Structural Equation Models. 
Using such an approach provides the same conclusions as the results reported 
here. For instance, a Generalized SEM using the 2004–2012 data shows that NEA 
does not have a direct effect but unaffiliated does; NEA is fully mediated by views 
of homosexuality and abortion, and to a lesser extent welfare spending; and un-
affiliated is partially mediated by views of homosexuality and abortion, and to 
a lesser extent welfare and military spending. Period-specific SEM results avail-
able on request. 
5 Birth cohorts are coded in five-year intervals, from 1900–04 to 1980–84. Respon-
dents born before 1900 are grouped into a single cohort, and those born after 
1984 are grouped into a single cohort. 
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results indicate that the effect of NEA varied across periods (vari-
ance component  =  0.064) but not across cohorts (variance com-
ponent  =  0.001, n.s.). Moreover, period variation in the effect of 
NEA declines considerably when mediating variables are added to the 
model (variance component  =  0.035), which suggests that the me-
diating variables explain much of the growth in the association be-
tween evangelical Protestant and Republican affiliations. In contrast 
to expectations from political theory, the confluence between evan-
gelical Protestant and Republican affiliations does not appear to oc-
cur across birth cohorts. 
The dynamic nature of religious affiliation, with about a third of 
Americans switching religious traditions (Loveland, 2003), compli-
cates causal assumptions. Although social science research has gen-
erally focused on the potential effects of religion on politics, political 
preferences can also influence religious orientations and affiliations in 
the contemporary milieu where religion and politics have become so 
intertwined (Hout and Fischer, 2014; Patrikios, 2008). For instance, 
Putnam and Campbell (2010) suggest that some political conservatives 
switched to evangelical churches in response to the cultural revolu-
tion of the 1960s and 1970s, and that some political liberals disaffil-
iated from religion in the 1990s and 2000s in response to the politi-
cization of religion. 
This limitation can also be partially addressed with GSS data, which 
include measures of religious affiliation at 16 years of age. I used this 
retrospective information to replicate the mediation models in Table 
3 with the addition of a dummy variable for switching to evangeli-
cal Protestant.6 The omitted reference category thus becomes those 
who were raised and remained evangelical. As the results in Appen-
dix C show, those who switched to evangelical denominations were 
more likely than those raised evangelical to identify as Republican in 
1982–91. This suggests that early adoption of the Republican identity 
among evangelical Protestants was disproportionately influenced by 
6 Retrospective measures of religious affiliation are used to divide evangelical Prot-
estant respondents into those who were affiliated with an evangelical denomina-
tion at age 16 and at the time of the survey (“raised and remain evangelical”) and 
those who were affiliated with a different religious tradition when they were 16 
(“switched to evangelical”). There is no available information about religious af-
filiation between 16 years of age and the time of the survey. 
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religious switchers, which lends some support to Putnam and Camp-
bell (2010) argument that cultural “shocks” in the 1960s and 1970s 
led some conservatives to switch to evangelical denominations in the 
1980s. In 1993–2002 and 2004–12, however, there were large differ-
ences in Republican affiliation between those who were raised evan-
gelical and both NEAs and the unaffiliated, and no significant differ-
ences between those raised evangelical and those who switched to 
evangelical denominations. Models that split the unaffiliated category 
show similar patterns for those raised unaffiliated and those who dis-
affiliated in both 1993–2002 and 2004–12 but not in the earlier two 
time periods (not shown).7 These findings suggest that the causal ar-
row may run both ways. The early confluence between religious and 
political affiliations—particularly in the 1980s—may have been par-
tially the result of political ideology causing changes in religious af-
filiations, but in the 1990s and 2000s it appears to be largely due to 
evangelicals choosing the Republican Party and non-evangelicals shun-
ning the Republican Party. 
Failure to address other issues that are associated with both evan-
gelical Protestantism and conservative politics is perhaps the most se-
rious limitation to the above analysis. Two conspicuous omitted vari-
ables are views of women’s roles in society and the causes of racial 
inequality. Evangelical Protestants are relatively likely to support tra-
ditional gender roles (Gay et al., 1996) and political conservatism has 
become more highly correlated with support for traditional gender 
roles (Saunders and Abramowitz, 2007). There is a similar pattern 
with views of structural causes of inequality. Evangelical Protestants 
are relatively unlikely to support structural attempts to alleviate ra-
cial inequality (Taylor and Merino, 2011). Since the mid-1960s, there 
7 I examined models identical to those in Appendix C but with two unaffiliated 
dummy variables: raised unaffiliated and switched to unaffiliated (results avail-
able on request). The patterns for the two unaffiliated groups (relative to raised 
evangelicals) are very similar in 1993–2002 and in 2004–12. In 1973–80 and 
1982–91, however, switched to unaffiliated had a strong, negative effect on Re-
publican affiliation that was partially mediated while raised unaffiliated did not 
have a significant effect on Republican affiliation. These results are likely influ-
enced by the small sample size of raised unaffiliated as there were relatively few 
raised unaffiliated respondents in 1973–80 (N  =  44, 0.86% of sample) and 1982–
91 (N  =  54, 1.39% of sample) compared to 1993–2002 (N  =  110, 3.64% of sam-
ple) and 2004–12 (N  =  122, 5.44% of sample). 
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has also been increasing polarization between Democrats and Repub-
licans in their views of government-funded attempts to alleviate ra-
cial inequality (Carmines and Stimson, 1989). 
GSS data include relevant measures of views of both women’s roles 
in society and structural causes of racial inequality, but these ques-
tions were only included in select years of the GSS, and in some years 
administered to only a subset of respondents. I replicated the media-
tion analysis in Table 3 with the addition of scales of support for tra-
ditional gender roles8 and opposition to structural causes of racial in-
equality9 as mediators. Due to the limited sample size, however, the 
models are not divided into four time periods but instead employ ag-
gregate GSS data from 1985 to 2012.10 The results are reported in Ap-
pendix D. Support for traditional gender roles did not have a direct 
effect on Republican affiliation, nor did it mediate the effects of ei-
ther nonevangelical affiliate or unaffiliated. Conversely, opposition to 
structural causes of racial inequality was positively associated with 
Republican affiliation, and it meaningfully mediated the effects of 
both NEA and unaffiliated. Nonetheless, the mediating role of views 
8 Respondents were asked their views (1  =  strongly disagree, 4  =  strongly agree) 
of the following statements: “A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her 
mother works,” “it is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever 
outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family,” and “a work-
ing mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her chil-
dren as a mother who does not work” (last variable reverse coded; Cronbach’s 
α  =  0.723). 
9 Respondents were asked if the following are reasons for income, housing, and job 
differences between African Americans and whites (0  =  yes, 1  =  no): “mainly 
due to discrimination,” “Because most (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) don’t 
have the chance for education that it takes to rise out of poverty,” or “Because 
most (Negroes/Blacks/African-Americans) just don’t have the motivation or will 
power to pull themselves out of poverty” (last variable reverse coded; Cronbach’s 
α  =  0.541). While these results should be interpreted with caution due to the 
marginal α, this does not necessarily indicate lack of unidimensionality, partic-
ularly with the downward bias associated with non-continuous items (see Liu 
et al., 2010; Sijtsma, 2009). A related “in-born ability” variable is not included 
in the scale because few respondents agree that inequality is due to in-born dif-
ferences (Schuman et al., 1997) and because it lowers the reliability of the scale 
(Cronbach’s α  =  0.510). 
10 These variables were also included in the 1977 GSS. The 1977 survey is not in-
cluded because the positive association between evangelical Protestant and Re-
publican affiliations did not develop until the 1980s. 
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of structural causes of racial inequality was relatively small. For in-
stance, views of homosexuality mediated more than four time as much 
of the effect of unaffiliated and more than five times as much of the 
effect of NEA. These results suggest that shared opposition to struc-
tural attempts to alleviate racial inequality do promote evangelical-
Republican confluence, but to a considerably lesser degree than do 
shared views of homosexuality. 
5. Discussion 
In the 1970s, evangelical Protestants’ odds of identifying as Republi-
can were not meaningfully different from the odds for other religious 
affiliates. In contrast, evangelicals are now considerably more likely 
than both the unaffiliated and other religious affiliates to identify as 
Republican. This confluence between evangelical Protestantism and 
the Republican Party is characteristic of Key’s (1959) description of a 
secular political realignment. As Key suggested, members of a popula-
tion category—evangelical Protestant—changed party affiliation over 
an extended period of time. Over the same period of time, non-evan-
gelicals disproportionately left the Republican Party. While individ-
ual elections may have been influential, these patterns were not con-
fined to a single election. This too comports with Key’s portrayal of a 
secular political realignment. 
The secular political realignment that promoted the confluence be-
tween evangelical Protestant and Republican affiliations appears to 
be largely motivated by moral and cultural issues. Evangelical Prot-
estants’ relative likelihood of opposing homosexuality increased con-
siderably, particularly compared to other religious affiliates. It is im-
portant to emphasize relative here, as opposition to homosexuality 
declined in the larger population, but evangelicals did not keep pace 
on this issue. Evangelicals’ relative likelihood of opposing abortion 
also increased markedly, compared to both other religious affiliates 
and the unaffiliated. At the same time, views of abortion and homo-
sexuality became increasingly associated with Republican affiliation. 
This is not only due to evangelicals with these views joining the Re-
publican Party but also to the departure of those with disparate views 
from the Party. Consequently, by 2004–12, views of homosexuality and 
abortion were largely responsible for fully mediating differences in 
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Republican affiliation between evangelical Protestants and other re-
ligious affiliates, which supports Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
These findings comport with the issue evolution model of partisan 
dynamics (Carmines and Stimson,1989). According to this perspec-
tive, long-term changes in a group’s partisanship will impact the party 
system so that parties develop clear reputations on issues that attract 
those constituents (Carmines and Wagner, 2006). Indeed, there was 
a shift in the content of the Republican Platform to emphasize op-
position to abortion and homosexuality (Layman, 2001; Levendusky, 
2009). “Frame extension” (Snow et al., 1986) of this sort supports the 
confluence between evangelical and Republican affiliations by broad-
ening the Republican agenda to include beliefs and values that are in-
creasingly prevalent in the evangelical Protestant community; or, in 
the case of opposition to homosexuality, decreasing in prevalence out-
side of the evangelical community. These shifts in emphasis provide 
cues that influence evangelical Protestant voters in particular (Calfano 
and Djupe, 2009). Of course, such cues may be off-putting to others. 
If, for example, support for homosexuals’ civil rights continues to in-
crease (see Schwadel and Garneau, 2014), this strategy may no longer 
prove useful, and the Republican Party may change course. 
Views of abortion and homosexuality are not the only relevant 
mediators. Views of government spending on welfare and the mili-
tary became increasingly robust predictors of Republican affiliation. 
Evangelical Protestants also became relatively more likely to oppose 
welfare spending. Consequently, views of welfare spending partially 
mediated the association between evangelical and Republican affilia-
tions in 2004–12. This finding supports Hypothesis 3,but it does not 
supportHypothesis5 since views of welfare spending had a relatively 
similar mediating impact on differences between evangelicals and 
both the unaffiliated and nonevangelical religious affiliates. These 
results comport with research depicting evangelical Protestants as 
concerned with the wellbeing of the poor but increasingly critical 
of government attempts to alleviate poverty through the redistribu-
tion of wealth (e.g. Hackworth, 2010). They also draw attention to 
the causal limitations inherent in repeated cross-sectional data as 
it is possible that evangelicals’ connection to the Republican Party, 
along with associated culture such as the consumption of particular 
media, led them to change their views of welfare spending (Layman 
et al., 2010; Layman et al., 2006). 
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Although the association between views of military spending and 
religious affiliation did not change over time, evangelicals were con-
siderably more likely than other religious affiliates and especially the 
unaffiliated to support increases in military spending. Views of mil-
itary spending mediated some of the difference in Republican affil-
iation between evangelicals and other religious affiliates in 1993–
2002, but not after. In the post-9/11 period, however, views of military 
spending mediated a notable proportion of the difference in Republi-
can affiliation between evangelicals and the unaffiliated. This finding 
partially supports Hypothesis 4 and strongly supports Hypothesis 6. 
Evangelical Protestants and the religiously unaffiliated now comprise 
two of three largest religious traditions in the U.S. (Putnam and Camp-
bell, 2010). The fact that these groups tend to have opposing views on 
key issues and to affiliate with different parties is likely to character-
ize American politics for some time to come. 
Conversely, southern residence was not associated with Republican 
affiliation after 1980, and evangelicals’ relative likelihood of living in 
the South declined. Although previous research argues that southern 
residence mediates the association between evangelical and Repub-
lican affiliations (e.g. Bass and Rozell, 2009; Layman, 2001), there is 
no support for Hypothesis 8.Evangelical Protestants did become more 
likely than other Americans to frequently attend religious services, but 
service attendance was also not associated with Republican affiliation 
after 1980. Despite the emphasis on the mediating role of religious 
participation in the extant literature (e.g. Fowler et al., 2014; Layman, 
2001), there is no support for Hypothesis 7. Conclusions from previous 
research may be influenced by the strong correlations between ser-
vice attendance and opposition to both homosexuality and abortion11 
as well as moderate correlations between living in the South and op-
position to homosexuality and abortion.12 When not modeling views 
of abortion and homosexuality concurrently with service attendance 
and region, results may suggest that religious participation and liv-
ing in the South promote the confluence between evangelical and Re-
publican affiliations. 
11 The correlation between frequency of church attendance and opposition to ho-
mosexuality is 0.276 (p < 0.001). The correlation between frequency of church 
attendance and the anti-abortion scale is 0.357 (p < 0.001). 
12 The correlation between South and opposition to homosexuality is 0.140 (p < 0.001). 
The correlation between South and the anti-abortion scale is 0.102 (p < 0.001). 
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There are, of course, important limitations to the analyses in this 
article. For instance, the models assess party affiliation but not elec-
toral behavior. The pattern of change in the association between evan-
gelical Protestant affiliation and voting for Republican candidates may 
be quite different (Brooks and Manza, 2004). Similarly, the results 
may vary with alternative measures of religious identity. While there 
is considerable overlap between those who are affiliated with evangel-
ical Protestant denominations and those who self-identify as evangel-
ical, there are also notable differences (Hackett and Lindsay, 2008).
Measures of a broader moral traditionalism that is not issue-specific 
may also mediate the association between religious affiliation and 
party identification (Brint and Abrutyn, 2010). After September 11, 
2001, it is possible that views of Islam are relevant to the relationship 
between religious and political affiliations, but unfortunately mea-
sures of such views are not available across years of the GSS. The 
relationships identified in this article are also likely to vary by race 
because the association between religious divisions and political ori-
entations is more salient in some minority communities (Kelly and 
Kelly, 2005) than in others (McDaniel and Ellison, 2008). 
Another limitation concerns the NEA category, which is an aggre-
gation that may mask important variation. Alternative analyses that 
compare evangelicals to affiliates of various religious traditions (not 
shown) support the general conclusions here in that evangelicals are 
now relatively more likely than most other religious affiliates to iden-
tify as Republican, and these associations are disproportionately me-
diated by views of homosexuality and abortion.13 Nonetheless, future 
13 I examined mediation models of Republican affiliation similar to those in Table 
3 but with mainline Protestant, black Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other religion, 
and unaffiliated as the focal independent variables (evangelical is omitted refer-
ence category). The results show a similar pattern to those in Table 3. In 2004–
2012, each tradition except black Protestant has a negative total effect on Re-
publican affiliation (p < 0.05) (these models control for race, which is strongly 
associated with party choice, as shown in Appendix A). Catholic has a moderate 
direct effect, but none of the other religious traditions have direct effects. Op-
position to homosexuality is the most robust mediator for each religious tradi-
tion. The anti-abortion scale is also a robust mediator for each religious tradi-
tion. There are two notable differences across the religious traditions: opposition 
to welfare spending is particularly important in mediating differences in Repub-
lican affiliation between evangelicals and Jews, and support for military spend-
ing is particularly important in mediating differences between evangelicals and 
affiliates of “other” religions.  
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research can add to the above results by examining temporal variation 
in the direct and indirect effects of other religious affiliations on party 
identification. Finally, the analyses in this article are based on re-
peated cross-sectional data and thus cannot definitively establish cau-
sality. Despite the general assumption that religion influences politi-
cal perspectives, the alternative analyses using retrospective measures 
of religious affiliation suggest that politics may have influenced reli-
gious affiliations, particularly in the 1980s, though longitudinal data 
is required to make a strong argument concerning causal direction. 
6. Conclusions 
The politico-religious realignment that led evangelical Protestantism 
to be strongly associated with Republican affiliation has fundamen-
tally changed American politics. Affiliates of one of the largest reli-
gious traditions in the United States now disproportionately identify 
with one political party. Unlike most forms of political change, where 
constituencies are strongly influenced by early life experiences that 
produce relatively slow, cohort-based social change (Alwin and Kros-
nick, 1991), the confluence between evangelical and Republican af-
filiations happened rapidly. In just a few years, the evangelical Prot-
estant community transitioned from relatively bipartisan to the core 
constituency of the Republican Party. This politico-religious realign-
ment is problematic according to theories that support a diversity of 
political powers and separation of religion and the state (e.g. Rawls, 
1993). The strong connection between one of the two major political 
parties and a specific religious perspective also runs counter to ex-
pectations derived from the secularization paradigm. At the core of 
the secularization paradigm is the theory of differentiation, which 
specifies that “religious and nonreligious institutions have become in-
creasingly distinct from one another” (Gorski, 2000:143).While this 
article focuses on individuals’ propensities for affiliations, not insti-
tutional ties directly, the results suggest that evangelical Protestant-
ism and the Republican Party have become less distinct from one an-
other, not more distinct. 
Finally, the robust associations between political affiliations and 
views of homosexuality and abortion suggest that culture wars are 
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pervasive in the United States. In his influential work on the subject, 
Hunter (1991) argued that contemporary political elites seek to mo-
bilize constituencies through divisive cultural issues, such as sexual 
orientation, women’s roles in society, contraception, and abortion. 
While empirical research is divided on the existence and growth of 
culture wars in the United States (e.g. Davis and Robinson,1996; Fio-
rina, 2011), the findings in this article lend support to the culture wars 
thesis. Views of abortion and homosexuality have become pivotal to 
party choice, which comports with Hunter’s description of deep di-
visions based on views of sex, gender, and reproduction. The Repub-
lican Party has reframed itself to emphasize its opposition to abor-
tion and homosexuality (Calfano and Djupe, 2009; Glaeser and Ward, 
2005; Layman, 2001; Levendusky, 2009), which aligns with Hunter’s 
depiction of elites seeking to mobilize constituencies through the use 
of divisive cultural issues. Political polarization may be limited to a 
few “takeoff issues” (Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007), but these is-
sues are salient enough to motivate political allegiances. 
Contemporary American society appears to provide an ideal context 
for culture wars and the blending of religious and political identities, 
with prominent policy issues such as abortion and homosexuals’ civil 
rights that are directly related to religious perspectives, religious in-
stitutions and networks of communication that emphasize such con-
nections between religion and politics, and political actors that seek 
to capitalize on these connections (Layman and Green, 2005). Indeed, 
for decades now Republican politicians have used the 1973 Supreme 
Court decision in Roe v. Wade to attract religious conservatives and 
depict American society as embroiled in a battle between the religious 
and the secular (Adams, 1997; Greenhouse and Siegel, 2011). The 2015 
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges that legalized same-sex marriage may 
provide a similar target for conservative politicians to draw on the cul-
ture war ethos to maintain the connection between evangelical Prot-
estantism and the Republican Party.   
Supplementary data — Supplementary data (Appendix E) follows Appendices 
A–D, following the References.
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Appendix A. Control Variable Results from Models in Table 2.
          Binary logistic regression                           OLS regression
 Republican Anti- Too much  Too little  South Anti- Service  
  homosexual on welfare on military  abortion Attendance
Constant −4.076***  4.098***  −3.022*** −0.498*** 1.522*** 0.687*** 2.599***  
 (0.290) (0.278)  (0.240)  (0.132)  (0.228)  (0.034) (0.260)
Age 0.003  0.025*** 0.003**  0.015***  −0.005*** 0.001***  0.017***  
 (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Age-Squareda 0.047*** 0.024** −0.027*** −0.030***  0.003*** 0.030***  
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.007)   (0.000) (0.007)
Female 0.067 −0.435*** −0.005 −0.223*** −0.049  −0.010 0.580***  
  (0.040)  (0.042)  (0.035)  (0.041) (0.038)  (0.005) (0.040)
African Americanb −1.623***  0.998*** −0.948***  −0.252*** 1.186*** 0.087*** 0.920***  
 (0.103)  (0.070) (0.059)  (0.068)  (0.056)  (0.008) (0.063)
Other Raceb −0.640*** 0.601*** −0.530*** −0.337**  −0.140  0.069*** 0.350***  
  (0.126)  (0.107)  (0.098) (0.126) (0.106)  (0.014) (0.110)
Married 0.076 0.443*** 0.043  0.067 0.209*** 0.041*** 0.320***  
  (0.047)  (0.048) (0.041)  (0.048)  (0.044)  (0.006) (0.047)
Children in Home −0.078  0.152*** −0.113** −0.056 −0.118** 0.045*** 0.236***  
 (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.041)  (0.048)  (0.043)  (0.006) (0.047)
Bachelor’s Degree 0.334*** −0.757*** −0.384*** −0.526*** 0.179***  −0.056***  0.604***  
  (0.050)  (0.049)  (0.045)  (0.058) (0.049) (0.007) (0.052)
Family Income 0.270*** −0.189***  0.351*** −0.001 −0.140*** −0.037*** 0.107***  
  (0.028) (0.026)  (0.023)  (0.025)  (0.022)  (0.003) (0.025)
Urbanc −0.237*** −0.465*** −0.244***  −0.181*** −0.359*** −0.046***  −0.210*** 
 (0.058)  (0.055) (0.048)  (0.056)  (0.051)  (0.007)  (0.054)
Suburbanc 0.020 −0.202*** −0.163*** −0.137** −0.439***  −0.032*** −0.212*** 
  (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.045)  (0.053) (0.050)  (0.007)  (0.052)
Ruralc 0.159** 0.507***  0.015 −0.113 0.369***  0.039***  0.073  
  (0.060) (0.074)  (0.054)  (0.061) (0.055) (0.008) (0.062)
Standard errors in parentheses; N = 14,480.
a. Coefficient and standard error multiplied by 100.
b. White omitted reference category.
c. Smaller urban areas omitted reference category.
* p ≤ 0.05 ; ** p ≤ 0.01 ; *** p ≤ 0.001 (two-tailed test).
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Appendix B. Random Effects from Hierarchical Age-Period-Cohort Models of Republican 
Affiliation with Random Slopes for Religious Traditions
  Partial model  Full model
  Variance component  Variance component
Period
 Intercept  0.028***  0.044***
 Non-evangelical affiliatea  0.064***  0.035**
 Unaffiliateda  0.083  0.019
Birth cohort
 Intercept  0.053***  0.062***
 Non-evangelical affiliatea  0.001  0.001
 Unaffiliateda  0.001  0.005
Both models control for age, sex, race, marital status, children in the home, education, family income, 
urbanity, and region; full model also includes religious service attendance, and views of abortion, ho-
mosexuality, military spending, and welfare spending; each survey year is a period (period N  =  24); 
birth cohort is coded in five-year intervals from 1900–04 to 1980–84 with those born before 1900 
grouped into one cohort and those born after 1984 grouped into one cohort (cohort N  =  19); indi-
vidual N  =  14,480.
a. Evangelical Protestant omitted reference category.
* p ≤ 0.05 ; ** p ≤ 0.01 ; *** p ≤ 0.001 (two-tailed test).
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Appendix C. Standardized Direct and Indirect Effects of Switched to Evangelical, Non-Evangelical Affiliate, and 
Unaffiliated on Republican Affiliationa
                                                            1973–1980                       1982–1991                     1993–2002                      2004–2012
 Beta  se  Beta  se  Beta  se  Beta  se
Switched to Evangelicala
   Total effect  –0.019  0.022  0.059  0.023**  –0.037  0.025  –0.002  0.031
   Direct effect    0.062  0.022**
   Total indirect effect    –0.003  0.006
   Indirect effects:
      Religious service attendance    0.002  0.002
      Anti-abortion scale    0.000  0.001
      Anti-homosexual    –0.003  0.004
      Too much on welfare    –0.002  0.002
      Too little on military    –0.001  0.001
      South    0.002  0.003
Non-evangelical affiliatea
   Total effect  0.008  0.023  –0.075  0.026**  –0.177  0.028***  –0.152  0.037***
   Direct effect    –0.039  0.026  –0.095  0.029***  –0.074  0.037*
   Total indirect effect    –0.036  0.011**  –0.083  0.013***  –0.078  0.016***
   Indirect effects:
      Religious service attendance    –0.003  0.002  –0.003  0.003  –0.009  0.005
      Anti-abortion scale    0.003  0.003  –0.020  0.005***  –0.015  0.007*
      Anti-homosexual    –0.033  0.008***  –0.037  0.009***  –0.040  0.011***
      Too much on welfare    –0.005  0.002*  –0.007  0.004  –0.012  0.007
      Too little on military    –0.003  0.002  –0.015  0.005**  –0.002  0.007
      South    0.006  0.008  –0.001  0.006  0.000  0.006
Unaffiliateda
   Total effect  –0.104  0.027***  –0.126  0.027***  –0.238  0.030***  –0.366  0.037***
   Direct effect  –0.079  0.028**  –0.080  0.028**  –0.128  0.032***  –0.209  0.041***
   Total indirect effect  –0.025  0.009**  –0.046  0.012***  –0.110  0.016***  –0.157  0.022***
   Indirect effects:
      Religious service attendance  –0.027  0.007***  –0.013  0.008  –0.013  0.011  –0.031  0.017
      Anti-abortion scale  0.013  0.003***  0.004  0.005  –0.028  0.007***  –0.026  0.011*
      Anti-homosexual  –0.014  0.005**  –0.035  0.008***  –0.046  0.010***  –0.056  0.015***
      Too much on welfare  –0.003  0.002  –0.002  0.002  –0.012  0.004**  –0.018  0.007**
      Too little on military  –0.006  0.002**  –0.005  0.003  –0.010  0.005*  –0.026  0.008***
      South  0.013  0.005*  0.004  0.006  –0.001  0.005  0.000  0.007
N  5145   3892   3021   2242
All models control for age, sex, race, marital status, children in the home, education, family income, and urbanity.
a. Raised and remain evangelical Protestant omitted reference category.
* p ≤ 0.05 ; ** p ≤ 0.01 ; *** p ≤ 0.001 (two-tailed test).
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Appendix D. Focal Odds Ratios from Binary Logistic Regression Model of Republican 
Affiliation, and Standardized Direct and Indirect Effects of Non-Evangelical Affiliate and 
Unaffiliated on Republican Affiliation,a with Views of Women’s Roles in Society and Structural 
Causes of Racial Inequality, 1985–2012
  Odds ratio
Non-evangelical affiliatea   0.768**
Unaffiliateda   0.410***
Religious service attendance   1.044*
Anti-abortion scale   1.332*
Anti-homosexual   1.652***
Too much on welfare   1.479***
Too little on military   1.783***
Anti-structural view of causes of racial inequality   1.179***
Support for traditional gender roles   1.035
Direct & indirect effects  Beta  se
Non-evangelical affiliatea
   Total effect  –0.128  0.025***
   Direct effect  –0.067  0.024**
   Total indirect effect  –0.061  0.009***
   Indirect effects:
      Anti-structural view of causes of racial inequality  –0.005  0.002*
      Support for traditional gender roles  –0.004  0.003
      Service attendance  –0.006  0.003*
      Anti-abortion scale  –0.008  0.004*
      Anti-homosexual  –0.028  0.007***
      Too much on welfare  –0.004  0.003
      Too little on military  –0.006  0.003
Unaffiliateda
   Total effect  –0.262  0.028***
   Direct effect  –0.152  0.030***
   Total indirect effect  –0.110  0.013***
   Indirect effects:
      Anti-structural view of causes of racial inequality  –0.010  0.003***
      Support for traditional gender roles  –0.005  0.003
      Service attendance  –0.026  0.011*
      Anti-abortion scale  –0.013  0.006*
      Anti-homosexual  –0.041  0.009***
      Too much on welfare  –0.007  0.003**
      Too little on military  –0.009  0.004*
All models control for age, sex, race, marital status, children in the home, education, family income, 
urbanity, and region; N  =  3584.
a. Evangelical Protestant omitted reference category.
* p ≤ 0.05 ; ** p ≤ 0.01 ; *** p ≤ 0.001 (two-tailed test).
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Reviewer Appendix A. Standardized Direct and Indirect Effects of  













 Beta  se Beta  se Beta  se Beta  se Beta  se Beta  se 
  Total Effect -.064 .032* -.100 .062 -.152 .034*** -.087 .035* -.095 .032** -.361 .036*** 
  Direct Effect .010 .031   -.075 .034* -.026 .032 -.019 .029 -.190 .041*** 
  Total Indirect Effect -.074 .014***   -.077 .015*** -.061 .016*** -.077 .013*** -.171 .023*** 
  Indirect Effects:                 
     Religious Service Attendance -.010 .006   -.009 .005 -.006 .004 -.008 .005 -.033 .019 
     Anti-Abortion Scale -.020 .008**   -.012 .005* -.011 .004* -.014 .006* -.031 .012* 
     Anti-Homosexual -.030 .009**   -.039 .011*** -.021 .008** -.028 .008** -.057 .016*** 
     Too Much on Welfare -.013 .006*   -.008 .006 -.013 .006* -.010 .005 -.019 .006** 
     Too Little on Military -.001 .006   -.009 .006 -.010 .008 -.017 .007* -.030 .007*** 
     South -.000 .003   -.000 .006 -.000 .002 -.000 .004 -.001 .007 
Notes: Models control for age, sex, race, marital status, children in the home, education, family income, and urbanity; N=2292. 
a Evangelical Protestant omitted reference category 































Notes: Model controls for age, sex, race, marital status, children in the home, education, family income, and 
urbanity; N=2292. 








































Reviewer Appendix C. Indirect Effects on Republican Affiliation Derived from Generalized 
Structural Equation Model, 2004-2012 
 Independent Variables 
 Non-Evangelical Affiliate Unaffiliated 
                  b  se                  b  se 
Direct Effect  -.132 .076 -.542 .119*** 
Indirect Effects         
     Religious Service Attendance -.003 .003 -.042 .023 
     Anti-Abortion Scale -.130 .051* -.334 .124** 
     Anti-Homosexual -.192 .056*** -.389 .109*** 
     Too Much on Welfare -.072 .030* -.126 .041** 
     Too Little on Military -.033 .034 -.234 .057*** 
     South -.001 .029 -.002 .045 
Notes: Model controls for age, sex, race, marital status, children in the home, education, family income, and 
urbanity; see Reviewer Appendix B for structural equation model results; N=2292. 

































Evangelical Protestant Non-Evangelical Affiliate Unaffiliated
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Reviewer Appendix E. Ratio of Republican Affiliation—Evangelical Protestant Percent 
Republican ÷ Non-Evangelical Percent Republican 
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